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ABSTRACT
This paper reports on an applied general equilibrium
regional model for Canada which is used to investigate the
regional effects of taxes. Earlier, literature on regional tax
effects is reviewed and the main features of the model are
briefly described. Existing literature on regional tax effects
is largely non-quantitative, and does not discuss several
important regional features of taxes, such as taxes which are
predominantly on products or industries located in particular
regions. Results suggest that regional effects of taxes can be
significant, and in the Canadian case at least, do not tend to
counterbalance one another. In general, richer regions tend to
lose and poorer regions gain from federal taxes, but other
regional characteristics such as manufacturing/non-manufacturing,
or resource/non—resource can be important.
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Only a small segment of existing public finance literature deals explicitly with the regional
effects of taxes, and little of it is numerical in orientation. And yet in many countries
the regional dimensions of economic policy are increasingly coming to the fore in debates
on both tax and other issues. Taxes which affect products heavily produced in particular
regions are often seen as regionally unfair. Regional tax exporting is a further contentious
issue, either through deductibility of regional or local taxes at national level, or through
tax induced changes in the interregional terms of trade. And there is further debate as to
the effects of taxes on regional factor mobility.
In part, the lack of literature dealing with these issues is a reflection of the difficulties
of regional modelling. Data is often poor, and the most appropriate analytic structure
within which these issues, and especially interregional factor mobility, can be adequately
captured is not clear from existing literature. But despite these problems the importance
of regional dimensions in tax policy design remains.
These considerations motivate the use in this paper of a Canadian applied general
equilibrium regional model to analyze some of the more prominent regional effects of taxes.1
In the sections which follow we comment on previous literature, describe the structure of
our model, and report model results. These suggest that regional effects of taxes, at least
in the Canadian case, can be pronounced, and, importantly, do not counterbalance one
another across different taxes to yield a regionally balanced tax system. In the main, the
regional effects of federal taxes appear to be self-reinforcing, benefiting poorer and/or non-
manufacturing regions at the expense of richer and/or manufacturing regions. Regional
impacts of provincial taxes tend to be in favour of larger regions which can export part
of their taxes through effects on the interregional terms of trade, but these are smaller
than for federal taxes. One implication of these results would seem to be that the regional
effects of federal taxes in Canada are part of a wider system of interregional redistribution,
in which taxes partially compensate for the interregional effects of other federal policies,
such as trade and industrial policies.
This model is described in more detail in Jones and Whalley (forthcoming) and in
Trela and Whalley (1986), where its application to a variety of other regional issues is also
discussed. The volume by Trela and Whalley also presents some preliminary calculations
of regional tax effects which are taken substantially further in this paper.
1II. Regional Effects of Taxes
The regional effects of both national and sub-national taxes have been a topic of policy
debate in federal states for many years. In Canada, limits were placed on the taxing
powers of provincial governments at the time of Confederation in 1867. Indirect taxes on
commodities such as wheat were viewed as taxes which could potentially be shifted onto
other regions through changes in the interregional terms of trade, and so provincial taxing
powers were limited to direct taxes, i.e., taxes seen as borne directly by the regions paying
the tax. Although provinces now use indirect taxes such as retail sales taxes, the issue of
which taxing powers various levels of government should be allowed to use has been an
ongoing theme of Canadian policy debate.
In analyzing what regional effects both national and sub-national taxes can have, a
variety of factors come into play, and as we mention in our Introduction these have been
little analyzed in previous literature. Existing literature on regional effects of taxes seems
to have three distinct strands.
First there are regional tax incidence calculations, examining the incidence effects
across regions of both national and regional taxes. This work seeks to evaluate the regional
effects of taxes using shifting assumptions and associated distributive series.1 Gillespie
(1980, p. 141), for instance, reports regional tax incidence calculations for Canada by
income class by region, where five regional versions of the distributive series commonly
used in national calculations are employed. The picture that emerges is that, outside
of the Prairie regions, regional incidence patterns by income range are broadly similar
to national patterns. Although no behavioural impacts (terms of trade effects, induced
mobility responses, etc.) are captured by such analyses, these results suggest that regional
effects of taxes are not that significant.
A second strand of literature derives from McLure's (1967) work on interstate effects
of corporate taxes in the U.S. This literature emphasizes the deductibility of state and
local taxes from federal taxes, and the resulting ability of subnational jurisdictions to have
other jurisdictions share in the financing costs of locally provided services. Since McLure's
paper, this same theme has reappeared in a number of studies of fiscal federalism in the
United States; a recent example, for instance, is Morgan and Mutti (1985).
1 This approach to national tax incidence issues has been widely employed in the public
finance literature for many years. Pechman and Okner's (1974) work on the U.S. tax
system is some of the best known in this tradition.
2A third strand of literature attempts to determine the interregional incidence effects
of taxes using Harberger-type general equilibrium models. These models capture tax
exporting effects through impacts on the interregional terms of trade, but this literature
is exclusively theoretical and uses strong assumptions on interregional factor mobility to
obtain clear analytical results. McLure (1969), for instance, presents a general equilibrium
analysis of the interregional incidence effects of several types of taxes' levied in one region
in a larger country, assuming that labour is interregionally immobile, capital interregionally
mobile, and with the residence of both workers and capital owners assumed fixed.
Relatively neglected in all this literature are: the interregional terms of trade effects
associated with national rather than regional taxes, the effects of taxes on interregional
factor mobility, the effects of national taxes which apply to industries heavily concen-
trated in particular regions, and other issues such as regional effects of taxes which affect
interregional transportation costs.
Most of these are contentious issues in the Canadian case. Since manufacturing in-
dustry is heavily concentrated in Central Canada, the regional implications of the manu-
facturers' sales tax, the corporate tax, or the lower corporate tax rate on manufacturing
and processing are much discussed. Also, with differences in regional incomeper capita,
progressive national income taxes clearly tend to redistribute income between regions. In
addition, since hinterland regions import significant amounts of commodities from large
central regions which act as price makers in interregional trade, taxes which raise trans-
portation costs are seen as being borne more heavily by hinterland regions. Excise taxes
on gasoline and other related taxes, such as vehicle registration fees, can therefore have
significant interregional effects.
Also, little work has been done which explicitly takes interregional factor mobility
into account in evaluating the interregional effects of taxes. This is an especially difficult
issue, since what one means by a region is no longer so clearly defined once interregional
factor mobility is allowed.
If capital is both internationally and interregionally mobile, and if all regions are takers
of rental prices on world capital markets, then the only effect of a regional tax applying to
inward capital flows is to discourage capital investment in the region, with no effectson
other regions. If capital is not internationally mobile but remains interregionally mobile,
the effect of such a tax is to change the interregional allocation of capital, having effects
Taxes on factor inputs, on consumption, and on production.
3on other regions.
Labour is generally believed to be only partially interregionally mobile in Canada. In
part this reflects costs of relocation and the search process accompanying induced adjust-
ments as external shocks affect regional economies, but locational preferences of individuals
also come into play. Capturing this in a convincing modelling framework is the challenge.
The Canadian regional general equilibrium model which we outline in the next section
is designed to capture many of these effects, and is thus used here to analyze regional
dimensions of Canadian tax policy.
4III. An Applied General Equilibrium Regional Model of Canada
The Canadian regional general equilibrium model we use is closely related to the applied
models already used to analyze taxation and international trade policy issues (see the
survey paper by Shoven and Whalley (1984)). A more detailed description of the model
appears in Jones and Whalley (forthcoming), the appendix of which contains a statement
of the model in full algebraic form.
The model operates both in basic variant form, and with a series of extensions available
which each enhance the modelling capability, but at a cost in terms of computational
complexity. The main features of the basic variant of the model are summarized in Table
1.1Aseries of regions are specified, each with a demand and production structure, and
interregional trade in commodities takes place. In contrast to existing international trade
models a series of further interactions (such as intergovernmental transfers) occurs between
regions. Also, the assumption of interjurisdictional factor immobility commonly made in
trade models is not made here.
Regions and Products
In the basic model variant a single period (static) model is used, representing six
Canadian regions: Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba/Saskatchewan, Alberta,
and British Columbia. Interregional trade in goods and interregional factor flows both
occur. A seventh region represents the rest of the world (ROW), with whom all Canadian
regions engage in international trade.
Each Canadian region has 13 industries2, each of which produces a single output and
uses both primary factors (capital services, labour services, and natural resources) and
intermediate products (other commodities) as inputs. The ROW also has 13 industries,
but production involves only capital and labour services, with no intermediate inputs.
Regionally provided public services are included as one of the 13 produced goods in each
region; this being the only good which is not interregionally traded.
Armington Assumption
The 13 produced goods in each region are treated as qualitatively different from sim-
The various model extensions available are discussed in Jones and Whalley (forthcom-
ing), and in Whalley and Trela (1986).
2Theseare: agriculture; fishing and trapping; mines and quarries; food, beverages and
tobacco; light manufacturing; lumber, paper and printing; metal and machinery; vehicles;
energy; transportation; utilities; personal and business services; and government services.
5Table 1
Main Features of the Basic Variant







Six Canadian Regions identified along with the
rest of the world (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario,
Manitoba/Saskatchewan, Alberta, B.C.).
Each of six regions in Canada produces 13
goods using both primary factors and inter-
mediate products as inputs. Thirteen goods
are also produced abroad. Each of the 13
goods is assumed qualitatively different both
across regions and internationally (Armington
Assumption)
Final demands in each region are derived by
maximizing a five-level nested CES/LES utility
function subject to a regional budget con-
straint. Intermediate demands reflect cost
minimization across sources of supply.
Both regional and federal levels of government
are identified, each with taxes and expendi-
tures. Intergovernmental transfers are
incorporated.






— variant(a) capital is interregionally and
intersectorally mobile, but internationally
immobile.
—variant(b) capital is interregionally,
intersectorally, and internationally mobile.
—assumedinternationally immobile, intersec—
torally mobile within any region, but
interregionally partially mobile; labour is
homogeneous across regions, but consumers
have locational preference leading to
partial mobility between regions (see
Appendix A for more details).
assumed internationally and intersectorally
immobile.ilar commodities produced either in other regions, or abroad. This is the "Armington
assumption" (from Armington (1969)), widely used in international trade applied general
equilibrium analysis. The reasons for adopting this treatment here are the same as iii
the international trade models; i.e., the presence of cross hauling in interregional trade
statistics, where the same good is shown as being both imported and exported by the
same region. It is also easier to incorporate interregional trade elasticities into the model
specification using this Armington treatment. The extent to which regions can change
their terms of trade and shift the burden of taxes onto other regions depends critically
upon the values used for substitution elasticities among the Arm ington products. These,
in turn, reflect one's belief as to what are reasonable values for elasticities in interregional
trade.
Factors of Production, and Interregional and International Mobility Assump-
tions
While three different factors of production (capital services, labour services, and nat-
ural resources) are used in production in the regions in the model, to simplify computation
only two of these appear as inputs in the production function for any industry in any
region. Non-energy industries use capital and labour services as factor inputs; energy
industries use natural resources and labour services. Resource inputs are treated as in-
ternationally and intersectorally immobile. The key resource inputs appear in oil and gas
(energy) industries, especially in the resource rich Western regions.
Two different factor mobility assumptions are used for capital services. In variant
(a) of the model, capital is assumed to be both interregionally and intersectorally mobile
within Canada, but internationally immobile. Variant (b) differs from this in also allowing
for international mobility of capital. These two model variants reflect the fact that the
literature is not conclusive as to whether or not perfect international mobility of capital is
a reasonable assumption to make for smaller countries such as Canada, even though many
economists consistently use it.'
The way in which interregional labour mobility is modelled is more complex, with
labour assumed to be internationally immobile, intersectorally mobile, but interregionally
partially mobile. Partial mobility of labour between regions is incorporated through a
distribution of individuals within any region assumed, who vary by their intensity of loca-
tional preference. Individuals trade off differences in real income associated with locating
See Feldstein and Horoika (1980), and Harberger (1980).
6and working in various regions against their preference for remaining in their region of ori-
gin. The effect is that in response to changes in relative regional incomes, only a portion
of any region's population migrates (see the more detailed discussion in Appendix A).
This partial mobility treatment is used for a number of reasons. The most important
is that a model in which labour is perfectly mobile between regions is not particularly
useful in analyzing whether, and by how much, regions gain or lose as a result of changes
in either national or regional taxes. This is because regions, as such, are not well defined
in such a model variant.' Treating labour as completely immobile between regions allows
interregional distributional effects of taxes to be analyzed, but excludes all the efficiency
issues associated with the regional movement of labour which have been so heavily stressed
in recent fiscal federalism literature.2
Demand Side
On the demand side of the model, products produced both within and outside regions
appear in the final demand functions for each region, including ROW. Final demands are
based on utility maximization, with each region maximizing a nested CES/LES utility
function subject to a regional budget constraint. Intermediate demands, which involve
a nested CES production structure, reflect cost minimization across within-region and
out-of-region sources of supply. The most important objective in designing the nesting
structure is to facilitate the incorporation of key elasticity parameters into the model,
including those which affect both interregional and international trade. This is discussed
in more detail in Jones and Whalley (forthcoming).
Each regional budget constraint includes capital, labour, and resource income received
by residents, along with intergovernmental transfers received from the federal government
and federal government transfers made to persons. Taxes levied within a region appear
in the region's budget constraint on the expenditure side, but also generate lump sum
transfers which reappear as regional income.
Since there is no data available in Canada (or any other country to our knowledge)
Furthermore, because of this treatment of interregional partial mobility, when report-
ing model results showing regional impacts of tax changes one needs to distinguish between
only those original residents of a region who remain after the policy change, the original
residents of a region including those who migrate outwards following a policy change, and
the remaining residents plus new arrivals.
See, for instance, Boadway and Flatters (1982).
7on interregional patterns of asset ownership, we make the strong assumption that in the
base (pre-tax policy change) situation considered by the model, all capital andresource
income originating in a region accrues to residents of that region.
Foreign Trade
The main characteristics of the model treatment of foreign trade are the Armington
assumption and the treatment of international factor mobility, both of which are discussed
above.
The way that the behaviour of foreigners is treated in applied general equilibrium
models is often important for model results.' In the present model, their behaviour involves
both their production and demand. An external sector balance conditionappears as part
of the characterization of equilibrium. This states that the value of imports plus the
net imbalance on the capital account equals the value of exports, and is equivalent to
stating that, as a country, Canada is always on its budget constraint in its international
transactions.
In the data used to calibrate the model the output of each industry in the Rest of
the World is set at approximately ten times the value added in the same industry for
all Canadian regions combined. This approximates Canada's position viz-a-viz its largest
trading partner, the U.S. The two most important parameters in this treatment of foreign
trade are the values chosen for elasticities of substitution between Canadian and foreign
products in demands in each region, and the size set for ROW, since these jointly determine
the international import and export price elasticities which regions within Canada face.
Taxes and Other Policies in the Model
Integrated into this treatment of production, demand, and associated interregional
and international trade, are both federal and provincial taxes, and a series of policies, all
of which have regional effects. These are listed in Table 2 along with a brief description of
their model treatment.
The main Canadian federal and provincial taxes which have interregional effects all
appear in the model. The federal manufacturers' sales tax enters as an ad valorem sales tax
on manufactures, with differences in tax rates by commodity reflecting the rate structure
For instance, Whalley and Yeung (1984) have shown that the treatment adopted for
the behaviour of the Rest of the World in single economy general equilibrium models can
crucially affect the behaviour of the model, since this determines whether the economy in
which one is interested is modelled as a price taker or price maker.
8Table 2
Model Treatment of Taxes and Other Policies with Interregional
Effects
Taxes Model Treatment
Federal Taxes Manufacturers' sales tax modelled as
ad valorem tax on both final and
intermediate purchases
Corporate taxes modelled as ad
valoreni taxes on capital inputs by
industry by region
Progressive federal income taxes
applying to income by region
Excise taxes modelled as ad valorem
taxes on both final and intermediate
purchases
Provincial Taxes Sales, income, and corporate taxes
in each region also modelled in ad
valorem equivalent form
Federal—Provincial Transfers Model Treatment
Equalization Systems of federal—provincial
transfers, with payments calculated
using explicit formulae
Established Programmes Federal—provincial transfers to fund
Financing (EPF) post secondary education and health
care —equalper capita transfers to
all regions
Canada Assistance Cost—shared regional transfers which
Programmes (CAP) partially fund welfare programmes
Federal "Nation—Building" Model Treatment
Policies
Tariffs Ad valorem tax on imports (final and
intermediate demands)
Transportation SubsidiesSubsidies on grain shipments from
Western CanadaEnergy Policies Provincial Royalties —advalorem
regional taxes which entering
production costs
Price Ceilings -advalorem consumer
subsidies, ad valorem producer tax
Exploration Grants -producer
subsidies
Regional Policies which Model Treatment
affect Trade and Factor
Flows between Regions
Barriers to free goods Ad valorem tariffs on imports from
flows between regions other regions in Canada
Capital market preferences Subsidies to capital use within
used by regions region
Other Federal Policies Model Treatment
Non tariff trade Ad valorem equivalent tariff on
restrictions (such as imports
textile quotas)
Regional Development Regional subsidies to capital use by
Programs industry within regions
Agricultural Programs Agricultural output subsidiesin the tax. Corporate taxes are modelled as ad valorem taxes on the use of capital service
inputs in each industry in each region. The manufacturing and processing incentive in
the corporate tax appears as lowered corporate tax rates for manufacturing industries.
Progressive national income taxes enter through different average federal income tax rates
by region. Excise taxes, including both federal and provincial taxes on gasoline, enter in
ad valorem form, as do provincial retail sales taxes.
In the case of most of the other policies entering the model, the treatment adopted
is relatively straightforward. For instance, the tariff is treated as an ad valorem tax on
imports into all regions in Canada, covering both final and intermediate demands and with
rates varying across commodities.
In a few cases, the model treatment is more complex. This is the case with energy
policies, where a number of different features come into play. Royalties are incorporated
as ad valorem regional taxes on resource inputs (oil and gas) used in energy industries.
Energy price ceilings (which were used in Canada in the base year for the model (1981)) are
approximated by ad valorem consumer subsidies on energy which maintain consumer prices
below world prices, and corresponding taxes on producers. The model also incorporates a
Petroleum Compensation Charge which was used to finance consumer subsidies covering
the difference between domestic and world prices for imports in the base year.
Implementing the Modelling Approach
To apply the model outlined above to the evaluation of the interregional effects of taxes
in Canada, parameter values must be specified for the functions used in the model, and it
must be solved for competitive equilibria under the various policy changes considered.
In specifying model parameter values, a calibration procedure similar to those used
in other applied general equilibrium models is followed (see Mansur and Whalley (1984)).
Calibration is most easily understood as the use of model equilibrium conditions and
equilibrium data to solve for the parameter values used in the functions in the model.
This involves selecting a set of parameters values such that data which characterizes a
benchmark (or observed) equilibrium can be reproduced as a model equilibrium. Only
when the model is fully specified and a policy change incorporated is the model solved
for a new equilibrium solution. Evaluations of the regional impacts of taxes follow from
pairwise comparisons between simulated (or new) equilibria and the benchmark equilibrium
to which the model is calibrated.
Thus, two types of equilibria have to be distinguished when using the model. One is
9'observed' or 'benchmark' equilibria which are given from data and to which the modelis
calibrated (and thus do not need to be computed). The second is 'new' or 'counterfactual'
equilibria which are computed as model solutions under changes in policy.
Elasticity estimates enter this calibration process by serving as identifying restrictions,
allowing the other parameter values in the model to be directly calculated. Since different
elasticities produce changed values for the other model parameters, therebyaffecting model
results, selecting appropriate elasticity values is central to the model specificationprocess.
The values chosen and the justification for these choices are discussedmore fully below.
Base Year (1981) Micro Consistent Regional Data
A base year 1981 micro consistent regional data set for Canada is used incalibrating
the model. The approach adopted in constructing this data set follows that ofan earlier
paper by St-Hilaire and Whalley (1983) which describes the construction of a 1972 national
data set for Canada.'
In the regional data, each region is treated as a separateeconomy, and the links be-
tween regions differ from those recorded between nations in international data sets. Trade
between regions is incorporated, but taxes paid by regions to the federalgovernment,
intergovernmental transfers received by regions, and federal government purchases of re-
gionally produced goods also appear. As a result, regions can be in either a surplus or
deficit position in their transactions with the federal government. In turn,a surplus in
transactions with the federal government can finance a deficit in a region's international
and interregional trade.
Developing a micro consistent regional data set requires that all the transactions
taking place in the separate markets and regions which comprise t.he nationaleconomy be
recorded. Provincial Input-Output (PlO) Tables for 1979 produced by Statistics Canada
as an extension to their National Input-Output Tables are the major building block used
in assembling the micro consistent regional data set used here. The PlO dataare updated
to 1981 using estimates of regional economy-wide aggregates from the Provincial Economic
Accounts (PEA) compiled by Statistics Canada. The PEA also provide estimates of federal
government transactions with individual regions, which are integrated into the data set.
Tax rates come from data on taxes paid and estimates of the relevant tax bases contained
in this data.
A more recent paper by St-Hilaire and Whalley (1985) gives more detail on thepresent
regional data set.
10Elasticities
Besides the 1981 micro consistent data set, the elasticities of substitution which ap-
pear in the production and utility functions are also important for model results. Most
important are four different sets of elasticities which affect commodity and factor flows
in the model. These are: international trade elasticities (on both the import and export
side), elasticities determining substitution effects between energy and non-energy products
in both final demands and intermediate production in each region,' elasticities affecting
interregional trade in commodities, and elasticity parameters determining the size of in-
terregional labour mobility effects induced by tax and other policy changes.
The international trade elasticity values used are based on a compendium of estimates
of trade elasticities due to Stern et a!. (1976). Model estimates for Canada are based on
the median point estimates for both the Canadian import demand elasticities, and the
export demand elasticities which Canada faces.
A recent survey of energy demand elasticities by Kouris (1982) reviews existing esti-
mates, and contains comments on possible ranges of energy elasticity values, although not
specifically for Canada. The Kouris study produces a range of energy elasticity estimates
(-.1 to -.5) only slightly lower than that suggested by Thirsk and Wright (1977) for Canada.
Estimates in this range are therefore used in specifying energy demand elasticity values in
the model.
Other commodities appear in the demand functions as a composite non-energy prod-
uct, with substitution between the component products entering the composite. Since
these are less crucial for results than other elasticities in the model, a Cobb-Douglas spec-
ification is used in the preference functions for this level of the nesting in all regions in the
model. This is equivalent to setting all these elasticities to unity.
There are no current estimates of price elasticities in interregional trade in Canada
since there is insufficient time series data on interregional trade flows on which to base
such estimation. The approach used here for setting these parameter values is the same as
Hazeldine's (1979); that is, to assume that elasticities in interregional trade are the same as
those in international trade. This approach is contentious, however, since a shares approach
to elasticity determination, based on a region's share of international trade, would suggest
that interregional trade elasticities would be considerably higher than international trade
1Thenesting structures in the model are identical for both final demands and interme-
diate production.
11elasticities. Model performance based on sensitivity analysis around these values, reflecting
other approaches to specifying interregional trade elasticity estimates, is discussed in Trela
and Whalley (1986).
Elasticities of substitution between factor inputs in value added functions in each
region are set at 0.8 for all non-energy industries in all regions, and 0.5 for energy industries.
These are a little lower than the values reported in the survey paper by Caddy (1976) and
used in Piggott and Whalley (1985), Whalley (1985), and Ballard, Fullerton, et al. (1985)
for non-energy industries, and reflect the lack of a compatible classification link between
other studies and that used in the present model. A strong assumption is made that
identical values can be used for similar industries in different regions.
In the factor flow area, different treatments are used for capital services and for labour
services. In the case of capital services, the two mobility assumptions discussed earlier are
used: either capital is assumed to be both interregionally and internationally mobile, or it
is treated as only interregionally mobile.
In the labour mobility treatment, the key parameters are those which determine the
degree of partial mobility of labour between regions. These relate to the mobility formula-
tion discussed earlier. The most recent study of interregional migration in Canada is that
by Winer and Gauthier (1982) who analyze the effects of fiscal incentives on migration.
In specifying the interregional mobility component of the model, it is, however, difficult
to relate the Winer-Cauthier results directly to the mobility parameters which appear in
the general equilibrium model. As a result, alternative values of the corresponding model
parameters are chosen for compatibility with different assumptions on the elasticity of out-
migration from a region with respect to interregional income differentials.'
See the discussion in Whalley and Trela (1986).
12V. Model Results On The Regional Effects Of Taxes
In this section we report results from the model which are relevant to an assessment of the
interregional effects of taxes in Canada. These are shown in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6. Table 3
reports the interregional effects of replacing various components of the federal tax system
by yield preserving neutral alternatives. Table 4 reports on the sensitivity of Table 3 results
to alternative model specifications. Table 5 presents results on the interregional effects of
both federal expenditures (including transfers) and taxes. Results on interregional effects
of regional taxes are reported in Table 6.
In all the model experiments for which results are reported, we limit ourselves to non-
energy and non-trade taxes. The former removes from our analysis the regional effects of
product specific energy taxes which have large interregional effects in the 1981 base year
used for the model, but which have changed substantially since then. The latter removes
tariffs from the analysis, which raise only small amounts of revenue but have international,
and hence interregional, terms of trade effects. Tariffs are usually considered to be trade
policies rather than key elements of revenue raising tax systems in advanced inudustrialized
economies.
The regional effects of individual taxes do not appear in the form of a neat division
between, say, manufacturing and hinterland, resource and non-resource, or rich and poor
regions.' This is because all these regional differences come into play in determining the
net outcome when any particular tax is changed. For the federal tax system in total, one
interregional effect appears to be dominant: that poorer, (i.e. lower income per capita),
regions gain from the tax system at the expense of the richer regions. This effect is
compounded by the inter- regional effects of federal transfer policies.
Case 1 of Table 3 considers the replacement of the federal manufacturers sales tax
with a yield-preserving uniform rate final sales tax covering all goods. The welfare effects of
the change are reported in terms of Hicksian equivalent variations for the original residents
of each region.2 The value in parentheses for each region gives the equivalent variation as
1 1981per capita incomes for Atlantic Canada, Quebec, Ontario, Man./Sask., Alberta,
and British Columbia, respectively, implied by the data used in the model, are: $10,410;
$13,585; $14,791; $13,669; $18,130; $15,303.
2 If the residents of regions who remainfollowing any tax change are used instead, the
differences in welfare results are small both in this case and in all other experiments. We
therefore consistently report results only for the total original residents of each region.
13TABLE 3
REGIONAL EFFECTS OF VARIOUS FEDERAL TAXES












































































Atlantic Canada —0.24 —0.31 0.37 —0.94 —1.04
Quebec —0.11 —0.46 —0.01 —1.04 —1.72
Ontario —0.09 0.24 —0.29 -0.23 —0.49
Manitoba/Saskatchewan —0.17 -0.29 0.47 -0.26 —0.36
Alberta -0.02 —0.01 0.54 1.38 1.96
British Columbia —0.15 0.37 —0.06 —0.28 —0.16
Rest of the World 0.20 —0.02 0.30 —0.26 0.37
Case 1: Replacement of theManufacturers' SalesTax withanequal yield
sales tax; capital both internationally andinterregionally mobile.
Case 2: Replacement of the Personal Income Tax; as in case I above.
Case 3: Replace the Corporate taxes on non—energy goods with an equal yield
factor tax. Capital internationally immobile.
Case 4: Removal of all federal non—energy taxes except for those of cases
1, 2, and 3, and except for the federal tariff; with replacement by an
equal yield sales tax. Capital internationally immobile.
Case 5: All federal non—energy taxes except tariffs and corporate taxes on
energy industries replaced by an equal yield sales tax. Capital
internationally immobile.
T Values in parentheses are Hicksian E.V.'s as a percentage of
regional income (as a percentage of GNP for the Total).
2Calculatedusing new equilibrium trade flows as weights.a percent of regional income, with the total change for Canada reported as a percent of
CNP.
Ontario gains $488 million from this change, Quebec $3 million, while all other regions
lose. B.C. loses $76 million while the others each lose over $100 million. All regions suffer
a terms-of-trade deterioration, since the sales tax applies more heavily to commodities
which Canada imports, and the model uses a non-small economy assumption. Ontario
and Quebec gain from the replacement of a tax concentrated on manufacturing by a more
broadly based tax.
Case 2 of Table 3 reports the interregional effects of replacing the federal personal
income tax by a yield preserving sales tax. Replacing this tax in this way results in
a gain for the high income regions---Ontario, Alberta and B.C.—- and a loss for the low
income regions. The small overall gain to Canada reflects the fact that this model does
not explicitly incorporate labour supply and savings effects of taxes. Thus, in this model
the personal income tax redistributes without imposing major distorting costs.
Case 3 reports results from replacing the corporate income tax on all non-energy
industries. In contrast to cases 1 and 2, the replacement involves a yield-preserving tax on
value added (rewards to factor inputs) within each region, and the change is made under an
assumed international immobility of capital. This replacement tax is used since the policy
change involves the removal of production side taxes. International capital immobility is
assumed in order to weaken any international terms-of-trade effects which arise in this case
due to the non-small economy assumptions.1
The results indicate welfare gains for all regions, except Alberta. While Ontario shows
the largest terms-of-trade deterioration, it is the largest gainer from the change. This is
because Ontario is the largest producer of manufacturers in Canada, and this industry
group is where incorporation is the heaviest. While Alberta has the largest terms-of-trade
gain, it loses the most because of the large corporate taxes on the energy industry (which
remain in place).
Case 4involvesthe removal of all federal non-energy taxes, excluding those of cases
1, 2, and 3, and excluding the federal tariff. The most important taxes removed in this
case are the excise taxes. The results here show losses for the hinterland regions, with the
exception of Atlantic Canada, suggesting the major tax effects enter through demand side
effects across regions via differential regional consumption of taxed commodities.
Sensitivity of the model results to these model features is reported in Table 4.
14Case 5 reports the interregional impacts of removing all federal non-energy taxes,
excluding tariffs and all corporate taxes on the energy industry. Capital is treated as
internationally immobile in this experiment, and the replacement tax is an equal yield
sales tax. All regions lose, except Ontario and B.C. While Ontario is the largest gainer,
Quebec is the largest loser.
Since case 5 involves the same policies as considered separately in cases 1 through 4
combined, the results are approximately the sum of those from the individual cases. The
large gain to Ontario arises mainly because of the removal of the personal income tax, while
smaller gains occur from the removal of the manufactures' sales tax and "other" taxes. The
cases for which Quebec loses are the removal of the personal income tax and the removal
of "other" taxes. The large loss to Canada as a whole in case 5 can be explained by the
removal of "other" taxes with which there is an associated terms of trade deterioration.
Case 5 also differs from cases 1 to 4 in its combination of assumptions underlying the tax
change. For this experiment the change is made with capital internationally immobile and
with an equal yield sales tax.
Table 4 reports results for case 5 from Table 3 for which alternative assumptions have
been used: Case 1 reports the results for case 5 if an equal yield factor tax is used in the
policy replacement, case 2 for the case if capital is internationally mobile, cases 3 and 4
for alternative values of Canadian import demand elasticities.
The losses for Canada reported in case 1 are similar to those of case 5 of Table 3.
The major difference from using alternative tax replacement schemes is in the allocation of
gains and losses by regions; in this case gains are larger or losses smaller for every region
except Alberta, which loses more.
Case 2 differs most in the estimated total welfare change for Canada. The loss to
Canada increases by over $500 million due to substantially different terms of trade effects.
In case 2, the terms of trade deterioration is higher for Canadian regions, while the terms
of trade improvement for the ROW is larger. Under an international capital immobility
assumption, federal capital taxes are borne by the Canadian regions. Under an alternative
international capital mobility assumption, some of the burden of these taxes are shifted
to the ROW, and removing them results in a larger terms of trade improvement for the
ROW.
Cases 3 and 4 involve alternative specifications for import demand elasticities in Cana-
dian regions. These experiments have been performed to further study the effect of the
15TABLE 4
SENSITIVITY OF TABLE 3 RESULTS TO
ALTERNATIVE MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND PARAMETER VALUES






























































Atlantic Canada -0.88 —1.60 —0.99 -0.96
Quebec -1.68 —2.42 —1.63 -1.57
Ontario —0.56 —1.25 —0.37 —0.28
Manitoba/Saskatchewan -0.38 —0.97 -0.34 -0.33
Alberta 1.83 2.45 1.92 1.89
British Columbia -0.21 —0.62 —0.11 —0.08
Rest of the World 0.47 1.31 0.24 0.15
Case 1; AsIn case 5, table 3 except with a yield—preserving
factor tax.
Case 2: As in case 5, table 3 except with capital internationally
mobile.
Case 3: As in case 5, table 3 but with the import demand
elasticity in Canada equal to 3.0.
Case 4: As above, except Canadian import demand elasticity equal
to 5.0.
1 Seefootnote 1, Table 3.
2See footnote 2, Table 3.international capital immobility assumption on the strength of the terms-of-trade effects.
The value used in the base case is 1.3, while the value for case 3 is 3.0 and for case 4 is
5.0. In these cases, the results of the change show a smaller loss to Canada as the value
increases and the terms-of-trade improvement for the ROW decreases. This is because
Canada moves closer to being a price-taker in world goods markets.
Table 5 reports results from policy experiments in which federal government expen-
ditures as well as tax policies are changed. For these experiments, we report the effects of
policy changes on labour mobility instead of the terms-of-trade effects, in part to demon-
strate the model's capability to yield estimated impacts on interregional migration. The
net labour migration into each region is reported as the total labour inflow from other
regions minus the outflow from the region. The units are millions of 1981 dollars of labour
income, and are measured in terms of the labour units in each region implicit in the bench-
mark equilibrium data set. The actual values reported for these cases are small due to
a relatively small value of the labour mobility elasticity parameter used,1 reflecting the
assumption that labour is only partially mobile between regions.
Cases 1, 2, and 3 report results of changing various elements of the federal govern-
ment's system of transfers to the regions. These transfers include Equalization payments,
the Canada Assistance Plan, and the Established Programs Financing (Health Care and
Post Secondary Education). In case 1, intergovernmental transfers from the federal gov-
ernment to regional governments are removed, with federal expenditures kept constant
through an equal yield subsidy applying to final purchases in all regions.
Removal of these programs results in gains for the high income provinces (Ontario,
Alberta, and B.C.) and losses to the low income regions (Atlantic Canada, Quebec, and
Manitoba/Saskatchewan). The large losses for Quebec, and in particular for Atlantic
Canada, are due to the regional concentration of the Equalization program on these two
regions. The pattern of migration follows that of welfare gains or losses, since labour
migrates from the major Equalization receiving regions to the higher income regions.
Case 2 involves the removal of federal government transfers to persons using an equal
yield replacement as in case 1. These transfers include old age security, unemployment
insurance (UI), and welfare. All regions except Alberta and B.C. lose when these transfers
We use a value of 0.05 as the elasticity of the number of people who wish to remain
in their initial region with respect to a given change in the labour income outside a region,
holding within region incomes constant.
16TABLE 5
REGIONALEFFECTS OF BOTH FEDERAL TAXES AND EXPENDITURES




Case 1: Remove intergovernmental transfers fromFederal govern-
ment; Equal yield subsidy on final demand; capital interna-
tionally mobile.
Case 2: Remove interpersonal transfers; replacement as in case 1.
Case 3: Remove intergovernmental and interpersonal transfers;
replacement as in case 1.
Case 4: Remove all federal transfers and federal non—energy taxes
excluding tariffs and corporate taxes on energy industries; equal
yield sales tax; capital internationally immobile.
T See footnote 1, Table 3.
2 Units are in $ millions of labour (as in the benchmark
equilibrium data). Values in parentheses are net migration as a





































































































(0.3)arc removed. Atlantic Canada loses the most, reflecting the concentration of UI and welfare
payments in this region. Ontario loses since it has an older population and receives a large
sli are of these transfers. Outward labour migration again generally occurs from the welfare
losing regions.
Case 3 reports results for the joint removal of both intergovernmental and interper-
sonal transfers. Welfare effects and net labour flows for each region are approximately the
sum of the results from cases 1 and 2, indicating no major interaction between these two
policy changes.
Case 4 involves the simultaneous removal of federal taxes as in case 5 of Table 3, and
the removal of all intergovernmental and interpersonal transfers as in case 3 of this table.
The welfare results are approximately the sum of those for the two cases. Major gains
accrue to higher income regions, with losses for lower income regions.
Table 6 reports the results of various changes in regional taxes. In case 1 we duplicate,
at a regional level, the federal policy change for case 5 of Table 3. Non-energy taxes,
excluding corporate taxes on the energy industry, are replaced in each region by a yield-
preserving sales tax. Capital is assumed internationally immobile, and since the rates
modelled here are low, interregional tariff barriers are removed.
The results indicate that all regions except Atlantic Canada and Alberta lose from
this change. Ontario's loss of $1.6 billion and the losses of $642 million and $448 million
for Quebec and B.C., respectively, outweigh the gains to other regions and, as a result,
Canada in total loses. These results indicate that regional tax systems benefit Canada,
due to the impact of the regional taxes on international terms of trade, with the greatest
benefit accruing to Ontario.
Case 2 reports results for a similar change except that only the personal income tax,
corporate income tax (excluding taxes on the energy industry), and indirect taxes are
replaced in each region. These results indicate that over one-half of the impact on Ontario
in case 1 is accounted for by these taxes.
Cases 3 and 4 duplicate the tax changes considered in cases 1 and 2, respectively, but
only Ontario's taxes are altered. The results for the case 3 change show a large loss for
Ontario, with Quebec gaining the most, and overall Canada loses from the change. Case
4 shows that the three tax components considered account for most of both Ontario's loss
in case 3, and the other regions' gains.
17TABLE 6
REGIONAL EFFECTS OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENT TAX POLICIES




Atlantic Canada 29 167 203 161
(0.1) (0.8) (1.0) (0.8)
Quebec -642 —257 756 600
(-0.9) (—0.3) (1.0) (0.8)
Ontario —1606 —991 —2569 —1881
(—1.5) (—0.9) (—2.4) (—1.7)
Manitoba/Saskatchewan —87 —34 193 172
(—0.4) (—0.1) (0.8) (0.7)
Alberta 148 235 274 241
(0.4) (0.7) (0.8) (0.7)
British Columbia -448 —285 141 121
(-1.3) (-0.8) (0.4) (0.3)
Total —1642 —271 —599 —222
(—0.5) (—0.1) (—0.2) (—0.1)
B.TERMS-OF-TRADE CHANGE2
(X change)
Atlantic Canada 0.05 0.97 2.09 1.73
Quebec —1.04 —0.56 2.21 1.83
Ontario —0.97 —0.60 —3.01 —2.55
Manitoba/Saskatchewan 0.05 0.12 2.12 1.80
Alberta 4.64 2.45 2.40 1.52
British Columbia -1.43 —1.06 1.50 1.30
Rest of the World 0.54 0.61 0.22 0.36
Case 1: Remove non—energy taxes in all regions, excluding the
corporate taxes on energy industries; equal yield sales
tax for each regional government; capital internationally
Immobile.
Case 2: Remove the personal, corporate (excluding energy
industry), and indirect taxes in each region. Replacement
as in case 1.
Case 3: Remove Ontario non—energy taxes, excluding the corporate
taxes on the energy industry; equal yield sales tax;
capital internationally immobile.
Case 4: Remove the personal, corporate (excluding energy
industry), and Indirect taxes in Ontario. Replacement
as in case 3.
1 See footnote 1, Table 3.
2 See footnote 2, Table 3.VI. Conclusion
This paper reports on an attempt to use an applied general equilibrium regional model
for Canada to investigate the regional effects of taxes. In the paper, literature on regional
tax effects is reviewed and the main features of the model are briefly described. Existing
literature on regional tax effects is largely non-quantitative, and does not take up several
important features, such as taxes which are predominantly on products or industries lo-
cated in particular regions. Results suggest that regional effects of taxes can be significant,
and in the Canadian case at least, do not tend to counterbalance one another. In general,
richer regions tend to lose and poorer regions gain from federal taxes, but other regional




A novel feature of the model, and one which differentiates it from other applied gen-
eral equilibrium models, is its treatment of labour mobility between regions. We assume
that there is a distribution of individuals within each region who differ only by their in-
tensity of locational preference. Their utility function parameters reflect this difference in
a systematic way across the original (pre-policy change) population in each region.
The utility function for any agent in any region is specified as the maximum of two
separate subutility functions. This is described in Section 1 of Table A-i. The U111 function
gives the utility from consuming a given bundle of goods if individual i remains in his
original region. The UIF function gives the utility from consuming the same bundle of goods
if the individual moves outside the region. If it is assumed that all individuals are identical
within any region, then in response to a changed income differential between regions all
individuals in a region would either leave or stay, and no partial labour mobility would
occur. To incorporate partial mobility, the U1F' function is assumed to vary systematically
across individuals within a region, who are ranked in terms of their intensity of locational
preference. The U' function thus incorporates the locational penalty which individuals are
assumed to bear should they leave and which is of increasing severity across individuals.
To simplify things, the strong assumption is made that an individual leaving one region
and moving to another maintains the same preference structure across goods associated
with all residents in his original region. Individuals do not therefore acquire the preferences
of residents of the other region after relocating.
These features, and an assumption that goods prices faced by each region are the
same, allow us to employ the two indirect utility functions shown in Section 2 of Table
A-i in determining an individual's location decision. U0" gives the utility from goods
consumption if individual 0 remains in the region. Since the subfunction U11' does not
reflect any locational preference (there is no penalty for staying in the home region),
TTH —— a
Location preferences enter through the function Us', which varies systematically across
the initial population within any region. The parameter t,shownin Section 3 of Table
A-i, reflects the utility penalty any individual incurs under out-migration. The product of
the parameter and the index i defines the intensity of locational preferences as one moves
from 0 to N through the index of the original population in any region. In the original
19Table A—i
Model Treatment of Partial Labour Mobility
1. Location specific preferences
U. =maxU (X), U' (X) =utilityfor individual I from
L 1
— consumingbundle of goods X
inside region.
=utilityfor individual I from
consuming bundle of goods X
outside region.
2. Indirect utility functions
-H H H
U1 =I •g(P) I =incomeif located in own region.
—F F 1F =incomeif located outside own region. U. =I •g(P) 1
g(P)=truecost of living (price) index
for consumption by individuals from
region. P is assumed to be the
same over all regions.
3. Distribution of individuals within regions by intensity
of preference for remaining in the region
F-F U —U—(6.i) 1—0, ...,N
U Individuals trade off Income differentials
across regions against intensity of
locational preference given by 6. As
u' =u1 UH= drawn,individual 0 is the only individual




4. Implication of Reduction in I
U Individual on margin shifts beyond
individual 0. Size of ot migration
H ____________________ determinedby slope of U function.
NumberNumber
Leaving remainingequilibrium situation to which the model is calibrated, only the first individual (i =0)is
on the margin between staying and leaving. All others are beyond the margin and have
an unambiguous preference for remaining in their region of residence. If relative incomes
change across regions, then some residents will be induced to relocate because the income
differential across regions will outweigh their locational preference.
In Section 4 of Table A-i, when a decrease in income in the home region occurs, U.1"
shifts down as indicated, and some of the individuals initially in the region leave. Out-
migration will also occur when an increase in income in other regions results in an upward
shift in u!'.Inboth cases, the size of out-migration depends upon the slope of the function,
which in turn depends on the parameter S. A simple fixed coefficient treatment is used
to specify how individuals leaving a region locate in other regions, but a CES distribution
function could also be used.
In this way the model captures the effects on migration decisions of regional differences
in wage rates, transfer payments to regions, and regional taxes.
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